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‘Humblewise’: Deference and Complaint 




When servants, laborers, and apprentices sued their masters for back wages or mistreatment 
in the Court of Requests they took advantage of the court’s doctrine of equity. Since these 
plaintiff s often lacked the strict written proofs required by common law, or were bound 
by unfair written contracts, they badly needed an equitable jurisdiction where fairness, 
extenuating circumstances, and broad social mores could overrule the letter of the law. Th e 
formal tropes of their Complaints negotiate the tension between these two conceptions of 
justice and reveal how that tension relates to early seventeenth century economic culture, 
where customary ideas about patronage and hierarchical obligations coexisted with emerging 
notions of self-interest and contractual equality. In appealing to the court with older but 
still vibrant discourses of social justice and mutual obligation, plaintiff s modulated their 
Complaints with expressions of deference and helplessness. Th eir pleadings therefore take 
the sophisticated rhetorical form of self-assertion articulated as abject submission. Th e 
documents are highly mediated by lawyers and institutional constraints, but nevertheless 
reveal subordinates tactically using expressions of weakness to elicit pathos and use the 
ideology of paternalism against their masters.
Keywords: Court of Requests, Employment, Equity, Paternalism, Service
When Th omas Dekker attempted to describe bear and bullbaiting in a 1609 
plague pamphlet, he thought fi rst of Hell itself, then the grim spectacle of 
unfair legal wrangling: ‘for the Beares, or the Buls fi ghting with the dogs 
was a lively representation (me thought) of poore men going to lawe with 
the rich and mightie’. Th e gruesome defeats of the crushed and mauled dogs 
(which he equates with the overmatched poor men) motivate this simile, but 
the comparison cannot avoid linking the discourse of poor litigants with the 
din of curs ‘whining and barking at their strong Adversaries, when they durst 
not, or could not bite them’ (1963, 98). Th us, even Dekker’s sympathetic 
portrait associates underdog plaintiff s with rhetorical, as well as fi nancial, 
poverty. While historians have found that poor men and women did in fact 
have some bite in the early modern legal system, the records of the Court of 
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Requests provide an opportunity to ascertain how (with the help of lawyers 
and clerks) lower-status individuals could submit complex and tactically 
formidable legal pleadings.
The Court of Requests, designed for anyone unable to afford common 
law suits, became a popular venue for servants, laborers, and apprentices to sue 
unjust masters. The court was relatively inexpensive, ‘a poor man’s Chancery’ 
(Seaver 1989, 51), but its most salient feature may have been its status as a 
court of equity, which meant that ‘principles of natural justice, common sense, 
and common fairness’ could ameliorate or override the rigidities of common 
law (Elton 1982, 152).1 This article attends to the formal qualities of Bills of 
Complaint (the long documents in which plaintiffs outlined their grievances 
and initiated a case) submitted by social inferiors, since these narratives often 
harness broader attitudes surrounding service, status, and justice while telling 
the litigant’s specific story in some detail. I end with an extended look at one 
instructive lawsuit to showcase these attitudes at work beyond the initial 
Complaint, in the defendant’s Answer and several witness depositions. The 
cases under study here all occurred between 1603 and 1625, and generally 
involve people in the greater London area. They primarily (but not exclusively) 
express relationships of service and mastery, though distinctions between 
service, apprenticeship, and employment – as well as degrees of status – are 
often blurry or contested. In fact, the institutional pressures imposed by the 
court make these records unreliable guides to the exact truth of the litigants 
or their conflicts, but they do reveal cultural expectations surrounding 
master/subordinate conduct, and they let us hear some specialized discourses 
employed when those expectations were violated. Overall, the documents 
indicate that in this court a plaintiff made a stronger case by emphasizing 
her or his condition as a dependent, not a contracting equal.2
1 Requests ‘could determine suits not on the basis of a strict reading of the law, but 
rather on the basis of the principle of equity or fairness’ (Seaver 1989, 51). Seaver’s article 
describes a single conflict between a Bristol notary and an apprentice who defied him. 
For a history of the court, see G.R. Elton’s The Tudor Constitution (1982, 187-199). Tim 
Stretton’s Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England describes the origins of the court and 
its business under Elizabeth (1998, 7-9, 70-100).
2 Despite the intention that this court serve the poor, it was deluged with more 
conventional lawsuits. Complaints directed from plaintiffs against defendants of higher 
status represent only a minority of the court’s business (at the end of Elizabeth’s reign, only 
17% of cases [Stretton 1998, 94]). For this reason, nothing in this article should be taken 
as an attempt to describe the overall archives of the court, which are quite diverse. Some 
cases may, in reality, certainly have involved conflicts between individuals actually quite 
proximate in social rank, or closer to business partners than masters and servants. In other 
cases, social status can be complicated by life-cycle mobility, as in cases when fathers sued 
on behalf of their apprentice sons. In such cases plaintiffs may be partially ventriloquizing 
the doctrines of paternalism to gain a better footing in the court.
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I focus on four broad patterns in the Complaints: first, they tend to 
describe economic relationships reliant on mutual trust. Second, they carefully 
signal submission to both the court and established social hierarchies, 
including descriptions of the plaintiffs’ deference to their masters. Third, 
they foreground the plaintiffs’ own abjection and weakness, but such self-
abasement prods the court to act on their behalf. Finally, the trials often 
set an informal sphere of verbal agreements and traditional social codes 
articulated by the plaintiffs against a formal sphere of written contracts and 
impersonal financial relationships preferred by their masters. This opposition 
almost always dovetails with the plaintiffs’ assertions that, because they 
either lack written proof or are burdened by unfair contracts, they will not 
receive justice through common law.3 The Complaints carefully leverage a 
‘public transcript’ of fair and proper master-servant conduct, what James C. 
Scott describes as a set of cultural rules for interactions between elites and 
subordinates that, while negotiable, remains largely a product of the powerful 
(as opposed to the ‘hidden transcript’ of covert plebian dissent). This court’s 
archive may usefully test Scott’s argument that ‘any ideology which makes 
a claim to hegemony must, in effect, make promises to subordinate groups’ 
(1990, 77). What appears to be false consciousness may instead represent 
tactical victories where subordinates ‘call upon the elite to take its own 
rhetoric seriously’ (106).4 Subordinates suing in the Court of Requests often 
managed to mount effective critiques of their superiors in part by signaling 
their adherence to dominant values.
3 Common law did privilege bonds, bills, and sealed obligations and technically refused 
to hear pleas without written evidence. In practice, however, the actions of many courts 
could be broader and more complex, especially given the rise of pleas of assumpsit, described 
by Craig Muldrew as a way of litigating informal agreements as trespass on the case (1998, 
204-209). But Lamar M. Hill explains that, for many, against ‘the harsh inflexibility of the 
law … equity remained the only avenue of redress’. Hill further reminds us that ‘Since the 
working poor had neither desks, offices, strongboxes, nor sturdy chests, indentures, bonds, 
and sureties were frequently lost, destroyed or stolen. Fraud was a further risk’ (2007, 139), 
and these are precisely the problems addressed in the suits examined here. Some suits in 
Requests were also intended to override prior suits in different venues.
4 Scott may underestimate hegemony and exaggerate the agency of marginalized 
populations, but his work remains useful for many contexts. One of his most sophisticated 
arguments seeks to establish how elites themselves depend on performances of the public 
transcript and may be manipulated by it: ‘the masks domination wears are, under certain 
conditions, also traps’ (1990, 55, see 49-50). The best account of Scott’s work for early modern 
studies remains Braddick and Walter’s introduction to their anthology Negotiating Power in 
Early Modern Society (2001, especially 5-11). For a thoughtful critique of Scott, see Andy Wood’s 
work, (especially 2002, 18-23 and 2006b, 41-46). Scott, it should be noted, underestimates and 
sometimes even caricatures other schools of thought on ideology. The Marxist tradition, for 
example, has long sought to emphasize how ideology ‘can never be purely instrumental ’ since ‘a 
class that uses an ideology is its captive too’ (Althusser 1990, 234-235).
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The conflicts at issue often involved people left vulnerable by fluid and 
informal arrangements. For example, Thomas Walklate agreed to serve John 
Field ‘for soe longe tyme as they should agree or like well one of another’, and 
he gave over a security deposit for his ‘Just and honest Carryage’. Walklate 
‘dulie and trulie’ worked as a tapster in Field’s Westminster ‘victuallinge 
howse’, but Field cashiered him ‘without anie Just cause’ and kept the money. 
Because their agreement was unwritten, Walklate correctly told the court 
that he had no recourse to common law, and bemoaned ‘gyveinge overmuch 
Creditt’ to an unworthy master (REQ2.310.11).5 Other plaintiffs likewise 
regretted entering into agreements for service, labor, or business ‘relyeing … 
uppon the faire speaches’ of people who promised to ‘deale liberally’ with 
them (REQ2.403.74).6 Conversely, some plaintiffs found that unfair written 
contracts gave their superiors undue power over them, but on the whole the 
documents indicate that participation in a fluid ‘economy of makeshifts and 
expedients’ often meant relying only on glib spoken promises that could not 
easily be enforced (Wrightson 2000, 57).7 Requests documents therefore 
give glimpses of the individuals ‘Toiling in the largely unregulated and over-
crowded labor sector that existed beyond the protected confines of the guilds’, 
a sector usually less visible in the historical record (Hubbard 2012, 4).
However, it would be a mistake to consider the informal economy that 
appears in these records to be an unregulated economy. Plaintiffs describe 
5 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations come from the Bill of Complaint (frequently 
the only document in a case file). I have preserved original spellings, but silently modernized 
i/j, u/v, and expanded common scribal contractions.
6 This interesting Complaint represents the different expectations that could arise in 
bargaining and the dangers of oral agreements. This plaintiff told the court he had already 
achieved independent status, but (after the defendant ‘did very earnestly intreate’ him) he broke 
up his house, sold his wares and belongings ‘at under rates’, and moved into the defendant’s 
glasshouse near Blackfriars. He worked hard to fix up the glasshouse furnace so he could be 
a factor in charge of sending glasswares to the defendant’s warehouse, but he was promised 
opportunities to profit with any ‘surplusage’. He thus ‘wholly betooke and imployed himself and 
all his tyme in the busines of [the defendant]’, trusting in the ‘performeance of his promises and 
protestations’. And ‘to give color to those his promises’ the defendant allegedly even offered to 
show him his account books to prove he had a lucrative business and was a generous man. Their 
‘bargaine and agrement’ was never set down, and so (it was alleged) the defendant ‘purposely and 
in Cuning’ waited until the glasshouse was fully functional, then ‘Comaunded him to depart 
from the same and to provide for himself ells where and so turned out’ the plaintiff. Lacking 
written evidence, he lost much ‘attendaunce paines & travell’ thereby. Fitting a trend I will later 
describe, this plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s superior status initially cowed him (he ‘did 
quietly depart and goe his waye’), but further financial difficulties moved him to sue. He knew 
his antagonists’ behavior went ‘contrary to all right reason and equetie’ (REQ2.403.74).
7 On the ‘economy of makeshifts’, Steve Hindle’s On the Parish? describes how a large 
and mobile pool of surplus labor survived through piecemeal work, short term employment, 
and highly diversified economic activities (2004, 17-26).
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a world structured by emphatic verbal assurances, mutual obligations, long 
familiarity, custom, fairness, and trust. One man who lived in Ralph Keyes’ 
house had scraped together five pounds for old age ‘by his hard labour’, but 
since he ‘repos[ed] greate trust and confidence in the sayd Keyes and wyffe 
that they would have dealt well with him’ he left his money in their hands. 
They ‘faythfully promised … in private betweene themselves’ to keep the 
money safe and give it to him ‘whensoever he should demand the same’, but 
Keyes and his wife allegedly broke their promise (REQ2.390.62). And when 
George Somers’ master began ‘as he then said takeing Likeinge’ to him, they 
discussed his transition from service to apprenticeship but the young man did 
not insist on strictly detailed terms: ‘suspecting noe fraude nor guile to be in 
[his master] but hopeing for good & just dealings’ from the man who ‘did then 
professe great love & affeccon’, Somers operated ‘uppon this trust’ and came to 
regret it. His master blocked him from setting up for himself, Somers claimed, 
on the grounds that he had not completed an apprenticeship (REQ2.308.7). 
Plaintiffs characterize the breaking of verbal agreements as cutting betrayals, 
and often speak of masters or employers ‘maliciously intended … carying nether 
for breaking covenants nor anything else’ but their own gain (REQ2.404.67).
Unscrupulous masters could also use their social position to pressure or 
mistreat dependents. The court would often hear about excessive workloads, 
like the extra tasks given to one plaintiff, ‘which he did not refuse to doe for 
that he knew he was servant to the said Sir Thomas’. This powerful master (a 
Justice of Peace in Essex) allegedly then dismissed the servant (a clerk and tutor 
from London) but detained his wages and belongings, leaving him ‘altogether 
remedilesse … yf he be not ayded and releved’ by the court (REQ2.390.49). 
Other plaintiffs complained of outright cruelty, but most said they tried hard to 
fulfill their callings: one ‘performed unto his said Master faithfull and painefull 
service by day and night’ despite ‘harde, cruell, and ungodly usage’, including 
‘unmercifull, and unmeasurable beating’ (REQ2.416.110).8 
These individuals’ stories were told in a relatively bleak economic 
climate. Keith Wrightson’s Earthly Necessities describes how a century of 
population growth, inflation, and expropriation caused real wages to decline 
and strengthened the bargaining hand of employers (2000, 145-148).9 Craig 
8 Such hard usage is a frequent enough complaint, but this master allegedly included 
some unique spiritual torment ‘by debarring [the plaintiff] for repairing to the Church … 
halfe a yeare togeather’ though the young man ‘much desired the same’. In another form of 
abuse, one Complaint from the 1590s alleges that a master forced his apprentice to falsely 
confess that he had ‘carnall knowledge & copulacion’ with a maidservant (REQ2.283.38).
9 Although Wrightson notes that this trend was less severe in London, the relative 
vibrancy of the London economy may have been counterbalanced by the disadvantages 
thousands of migrants encountered starting at the bottom of an unfamiliar and still highly 
structured economic environment.
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Muldrew’s account of macroeconomic change matches Wrightson’s and 
confirms the consensus view that social polarization and economic instability 
grew over the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as the labor market 
became more competitive (1998, 15-17). These changes naturally affected the 
culture of service. Alexandra Shepard explains that ‘the system of transitional, 
life-cycle service … was beginning to splinter by the late sixteenth century. 
Increasing numbers of men were becoming primarily and permanently 
dependent on wage labour … employment was scarce, irregular, and not 
particularly fruitful’ (2003, 209). Long term positions within a single 
household were often harder to find in Jacobean England.10 But Shepard has 
elsewhere helped to show that distinctions between wage work and service 
were not absolute: 
That wage earning of any kind could be represented as a form of servitude and an 
insubstantial means of living meant that a distinction between labour and service 
went readily unheeded … In this conceptual framework, providing work was 
constructed as a form of patronage benefiting the labourer rather than the employer. 
(2008, 85)
This sense of overlapping roles – servant and laborer, patron and employer 
– helps explain the Requests documents, since the plaintiffs (whatever their 
status) sought to activate the ideology of patronage that Shepard mentions and 
turn it to their own ends by reminding the court that an ideal master was (as 
William Gouge decrees in Domesticall Duties) ‘fatherlike’ in responsibility as 
well as in authority (1622, 687). Gouge emphasizes the parental role of both 
employers and masters within his general discussion of ‘equitie’, and Dod 
and Clever agree that they should act ‘as loving parents’ (1622, sig. Z5r).11 
Overall, as Bernard Capp notes, ‘early modern conceptions of social order were 
rooted in the principle of reciprocal obligations, and many authors pulled no 
punches in condemning employers guilty of cruelty, exploitation, or neglect’ 
(2003, 131). So although their Complaints may have run against the grain 
of orthodox conceptions of hierarchy by challenging superiors, in another 
10 On the decline of annual contracts, see Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos (1994, 70-
71, 175, 181-182). Bernard Capp agrees that, in towns and cities, service ‘periods were 
more variable’ (2003, 130, and see also Hubbard 2012, 30-32), but Capp points out that 
market forces could also sometimes work to the advantage of employees. Speaking about 
maidservants, he claims that ‘the massive demand for domestic labour’ in London ‘gave the 
well-qualified considerable leverage over pay and conditions’ (153).
11 Gouge rarely addresses the distinction between servants and laborers, but when he 
does he groups them quite closely. In one place Gouge foresaw that readers might object that 
his prescriptions apply not to servants but only to ‘labourers hired by the day’. He countered 
that ‘servants are in the same ranke: and the ground for both is the same: For both worke 
for wages’ (1622, 684-685).
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important sense the plaintiffs had powerful ideological currents on their side, 
and Eleanor Hubbard’s recent book helps show how ‘promoting and upholding 
conservative hierarchies and values’ could garner support for mistreated servants 
or workers (2012, 5). One relevant issue she traces involves how pregnant 
maidservants could enlist social sanctions against their masters since ‘fathering 
illegitimate children was an offense against early modern patriarchal values’ 
and ‘a danger to the order and prosperity of the community’ (80).12 The cases 
of sexual exploitation Hubbard finds capture some of the attitudes pertinent to 
the allegations of economic exploitation surfacing in the Requests documents; 
bad masters not only abused their servants but also abused their neighborhoods 
by creating social problems including poverty, strife, and even vagrancy. Ideally, 
Hubbard remarks, ‘Service was a crucial stabilizing institution’ (25), but only 
when service was itself stabilized by conventions of paternalism. Capp in fact 
argues that broad cultural expectations structured hierarchical relations more 
than the law: ‘the courts thus offered some measure of protection. It is likely, 
though, that most employers were constrained more by social convention … the 
very ubiquity of service must have encouraged some sense of communal norms’ 
(2003, 138). The Court of Requests presented a unique venue for institutional 
observance of social conventions, and its records display some of the practical 
problems and uncertainties surrounding the system of reciprocal obligations. 
Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos points out that those conventions could be vague 
and contradictory:
There is some difficulty in capturing the nature of the norms governing the support 
and assistance of masters to their servants and apprentices, for there was some 
ambiguity in these norms. That ambiguity had to do with the fact that the interaction 
involved in any service or apprenticeship arrangement – whether made for a short 
or long period, in writing or not – was, in addition to being an interaction based 
on contract, something akin to the special obligations associated with kin and even 
parents … This lack of clear boundaries between the contractual and the moral 
aspects of the arrangement of service could lead to many expectations, but at the 
same time to frustrations and disappointments. (1994, 170-171)13
12 Hubbard’s third chapter addresses ‘bastard bearers’, but she finds similar patterns 
through a range of issues where public economic concerns carried great weight, including 
divorce (2012, 171-172) and women’s work (189-191). What her findings underscore for the 
purposes at hand is how early modern culture expected masters to be not only patriarchs, 
but responsible patriarchs for the economic health of their communities.
13 REQ2.381.1 provides an instructive example of some ambiguities: Richard Snelling, 
a London journeyman, juxtaposed the vocabularies of service, employment, and trade in his 
Complaint: ‘should soe long serve and bee a Jorniman’; ‘should bee in service or Imploied with 
or by’; ‘by his said service & trade of Poulterie’; ‘entred into the said service of a Jorniman in 
the said Trade’. The conflict, moreover, hinged in part on how much he was truly his master’s 
man or his own – could he conduct his own business while out delivering poultry or should 
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To be sure, many of the allegations made in Requests concern clear 
crimes and transgressions. Savage beatings, detained wages, and starvation 
diets obviously breached both the contractual and the moral orders, not 
fuzzy areas of unclear expectations. But the straightforward conflicts as well 
as the messier ones took place in a world where contract and covenant, as 
well as wage-work and long-term service, coincided. Plaintiffs thus invoked 
the public transcript of what Ben-Amos calls ‘aids and benefits which were 
not made explicit in the terms of employment agreed upon in the contract, 
whether orally or in writing’ (171). To be eligible for those benefits, however, 
they had to stress their own subordination, a trend I turn to now. 
As the earlier examples began to illustrate, servants took care to signal 
that their pleas should not sound overweening, so they often larded down 
their Complaints with deferential, even obsequious language. Plaintiffs 
commonly began with formulaic markers about how their petition to the 
court will ‘humbly shew’ how they have been abused – one popular opening 
was ‘in most humblewise complaining’. These rhetorical tags likely indicate 
the influence of lawyers and scribes. But their descriptions of prior interactions 
with their masters may be the most interesting feature of the Complaints, 
and are (like the rest of the narratives) far more personalized. Since lawsuits 
are by nature adversarial, even the lowliest plaintiffs vigorously accuse the 
defendants of injustice or criminality. However, when litigating upwards, 
plaintiffs usually assured the court that they tried to preserve decorum by 
addressing their superiors ‘in gentle and frindly mannor’ (REQ2.390.62) 
or petitioning them only with ‘very humble termes’ (REQ2.308.7). One 
explained how he ‘oftentimes in submisse mannor Demanded’ fair treatment 
(REQ2.308.1). They went to court, they claimed, only after politeness had 
failed. Some recounted their desire for community mediation, and even 
maintained that they were ‘allwayes desirous of peace and quietnesse and 
willing rather to embrace it with losse and expence then by suites in lawe to 
be a gayner’ (REQ2.404.67).14 Often they stressed the superiority of their 
antagonists; one initially accepted a raw deal ‘to avoide contention and suites 
in law which he was neither willing nor able to sustaine [against] a great rich 
man’ (REQ2.403.74). Nearly oxymoronic constructions like ‘submissive 
demands’ and ‘humble complaints’ reveal the ideological contradictions 
he only mind his master’s business? Could he use the return journey to transport things for 
his own profit or not?
14 This case concerned an apprentice purportedly of gentle status who had been 
serving as his master’s factor in London when they fell out. But despite that status, he and 
his father still protested the ‘unnecessary expences and wrongfull vexation’ by harassment 
and expensive legal bullying in other venues – they claimed Requests was their only defense 
against the master’s ‘underhand dealing without great trouble and expence of money’ 
(REQ2.404.67).
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that arose when ideals of hierarchy and justice collided, but rhetorically deft 
plaintiffs could turn constraints into advantages.
One John Goldsmith’s Complaint uses several of these rhetorical tactics 
to leverage his own relative weakness into an asset. First, it contrasts his 
deference with his master’s imperiousness: Goldsmith wanted ‘arrearages’ 
due him ‘in liewe & recompence of his said service & paines’, so he 
approached Nicholas Bradshaw in ‘gentle & quiet manner’, ‘no way urging 
him or offending him’. But Bradshaw spurned him, ‘rayling at him & 
revyling him in the basest termes onely for demaunding his due’. Goldsmith 
suggested mediation by neutral parties chosen by Bradshaw, which should 
have been amenable to Bradshaw (who was a parson), but he ‘never would 
yelde to anie such peaceable meanes’. Second, the Complaint maps out 
the extreme power asymmetry between Goldsmith, a clerk ‘aged poore 
and utterlie voyde of other means’, and his opponent ‘of so greate friends 
wealth & estate’. By pointing out his reluctance to take such a powerful 
man to court, Goldsmith began to turn Bradshaw’s power and prestige into 
a legal weapon against him; Bradshaw felt free to withhold money with 
impunity, the Complaint states, ‘knowing howe unable [Goldsmith] was 
to Contest with him in suites of Law’. Third, even as the Complaint points 
out that Bradshaw is ‘of an evell Conscience’ it expresses a paradoxical 
confidence that if Bradshaw is required to answer the charges against him, 
then even this ‘Cruell & unjust’ parson will do the right thing: Goldsmith 
‘is perswaded that the said Nicholas Bradshawe will uppon his Corporall 
oath Confess & acknowledge the said agreement’ even though they had 
only ‘Communicacion … in private’ (REQ2.416.47). Suggesting that an 
overbearing enemy will freely confess occurs with some regularity and 
represents a curious but important trope of the pleadings. When a widow 
sued the powerful people that owed her money, she also added that she 
‘hath noe bonds or specialtyes to shew … for the proofe thereof as the 
exact rule of lawe doth require but hopeth that they beinge called into 
this honorable Courte will uppon their severall oathes acknowledge and 
Confesse’. Though perhaps wishful thinking, such claims also made a key 
rhetorical move. Plaintiffs thereby acknowledged their inability to prosecute 
the case at common law, but simultaneously moved the conflict onto the 
moral terrain of equity, framing the case not as a test of law but as a test of 
their opponent’s character. These formulations also sent a tactful signal that 
the plaintiffs depended wholly on the court and endorsed its infallibility. 
This widow was a seamstress, not a live-in servant or full-time employee, and 
the sums she mentioned add up to far more than bare subsistence wages (she 
may have been something more like a pawnbroker or an informal retailer), 
but she still worked from the same cultural script; she told the court that 
the money owed her for various wares and ‘parcells of semestrye’ amount 
to ‘the greatest parte of [her] estate and mainteyneance’. She feared ‘great 
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impoverishinge and decaye … being but a poore widdowe’. In contrast, 
the people she sued used their social station to make grand promises but 
then continually delayed payment, despite the widow’s ‘quiett and friendly’ 
entreaties (REQ2.391.48).15
Overall, when plaintiffs represented themselves as downtrodden victims, 
they engaged in polyvalent gestures of submission and self-assertion. They 
attempted to shame their adversaries, and rhetorically constructed the trial as 
a means to merciful redress of injustices perpetrated by the strong upon the 
weak. As Scott explains, ‘the dominant elite’s flattering self-portrait … can 
become a political resource for subordinates’ (1990, 54). Moreover, plaintiffs 
who turned poverty into a badge of honor inverted some prejudices that 
Alexandra Shepard notes ‘could make witnesses of little or no worth highly 
vulnerable to discrediting techniques’; her survey of social evaluation in church 
courts shows that ‘More routinely the bottom end of the social hierarchy was 
elided with the depths of the moral hierarchy, and poverty was often readily 
linked with dishonesty’ (2008, 81-82). In Requests, in contrast, plaintiffs 
stressed their economic vulnerability in a form of what Scott calls ‘symbolic 
jujitsu’ (1990, 98). Moreover, while surely not all of them entered into their 
agreements thinking of traditional forms of patronage, they rhetorically 
labored to suggest that their antagonists have violated a social contract even 
if a formal contract did not exist or worked against them.16 Scott casts himself 
as an antidote to theorists who overstress false consciousness, among whom he 
includes Pierre Bourdieu. While Bourdieu’s work primarily tries to account 
for the durability of domination, often focusing on social reproduction more 
than resistance, he also consistently points out that ‘the “great” can least 
afford to take liberties with the official norms and they have to pay for their 
outstanding value with exemplary conformity to the values of the group’ 
(1990, 129). Plaintiffs poor in economic and social capital could still draw 
upon this specific bank of cultural capital, this reservoir of collective values, 
and so might hope to benefit from such exemplary conformity.
15 Such abuse of status is the subject of the third case Lamar Hill examines in his 
article on debt litigation. A Cumberland tailor did business with a local gentleman and 
‘whether he liked it or not, [he] had little choice but to extend unsecured credit’ (2007, 147).
16 Tim Stretton’s study of women in the Elizabethan Court of Requests notices a similar 
trend: ‘the pleadings of women are marked by the variety and intensity of the imagery of 
weakness and poverty’ and he calls that imagery ‘perhaps the clearest distinction which can 
be identified between the pleadings of women (excepting married women) and the pleadings 
of men’ (1998, 180). I agree with Stretton, but some male servants, laborers, and apprentices 
employed similar language. The emotional impact of vulnerability clearly had some hold on the 
judges (called Masters of Requests) and could be exploited by men as well. But the overall picture 
of male plaintiffs has been muddled by the large numbers of wealthier men who sued in this 
court, drawn by its low costs, speedy process, and ability to override common law. The concept 
of a ‘social contract’ gives Seaver’s article on the breakdown of a Bristol apprenticeship its title.
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The Complaint of an apprentice tricked into signing a ‘fraudulently 
appoynted’ indenture reinforces these points and ends with a good example 
of the ways economically marginalized plaintiffs shifted the debate from 
written documents to broad cultural values. He entered into an apprenticeship 
as ‘a poore younge ladd resting in fyrme hope of his future good and that 
his said new Master would not faile in performance of his word’. Upending 
the stereotypes about shifty subordinates, he explained how ‘his said master 
Thomas Wildsmith offered in outward shew to performe his former promise 
honestly’, but the young man eventually learned that he (‘beinge wholly 
illiterate’) had signed an agreement, ‘without anie Doubt or suspicion’, 
stipulating that his final payment would not be due for 100 years. This 
victim of an outrageous fraud still took pains to demonstrate that his high 
moral ground should not be misinterpreted as presumption above his low 
social station:
[He] beinge thereat much agreaved yet notwithstandinge thinkinge yt to bee his 
Dutye to construe his said masters bill rather to bee a mistakeinge of the Scrivener 
before named then a voluntary combinacion of his master with the said Scrivener 
to deceave him … [he] moved his said master Thomas Wildsmith in as humble and 
good manner (as became a dutifull servant) touchinge the said bill … But receveing 
noe reasonable or Contentive answer from him therein he was advised it was not 
meet or fitt for him then to make anie great question or to contest with his said 
master farther until the true daye of payment should come.
This apprentice thus argued that he observed the proper decorum even in the 
face of a gross injustice. He patiently trusted in his master until (after seven 
years) he asked ‘in peacefull and quiet manner’ but received a ‘delatory and 
mockinge answer’ from his master’s family ‘to come unto them about an 
hundred yeares hence’. Deportment, as reported in these pleadings, is therefore 
not merely window-dressing, but an alternative form of proof; lacking strict 
legal footing, social subordinates set their respectful manners against the 
domineering conduct of their masters as behavioral evidence that the conflict 
arose from serious breaches in the reciprocal ethics of service. Like many others, 
this plaintiff wanted basic but unwritten expectations of fair play to overrule the 
letter of the law and exploitative contracts. He admitted (like virtually all other 
plaintiffs) ‘that by the strict rules of the Comon lawes of this Realme hee can 
have noe remedy’, but he also pointed out that ‘noe man of judgement’ could 
defend a 100 year delay (REQ2.403.14). Such plaintiffs negotiated a tricky 
social and legal position created by the hazy interstices of contract law, natural 
law, hierarchy and equity. Self-effacing yet carefully forceful, they skillfully 
walked a tightrope between impotence and impudence.
Likewise, they used intense descriptions of their abjection to trigger the 
raison-d’ être of this court designed for the disadvantaged. When Richard 
Popkin ‘beinge a poore servant’ discovered his master and mistress cheating 
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him by manipulating debts and tallies ‘hee perceaved hee was abused therein 
yett knewe not how to finde out the same Injury and wronge nor how to help 
himselfe’. His adversaries involved a constable, and ‘with diverse menaces and 
unchristian speeches threatned that he should die and rott in prison’ until 
he became so ‘terrified with their threateninge hee was att his witts end not 
knowinge what to doe beinge destitute of frends and beinge himself veary 
poore’. Fraudulent papers remained ‘a bridle to restreyne [him] from seekinge 
his due’, and he ‘is Constreyned to obscure himselfe’ for fear of arrest. But even 
he suggested that his oppressors would ‘sett forth and Confesse the truth’ in 
court (REQ2.305.48). And the Complaint of two men retained to excavate 
a patch of ground that turned out to be ‘a quicke sande full of springes’ 
illustrates both the vagaries of employment conditions and the discourses of 
desperation. These ‘poore daie Laborers’ thought they had made a good deal 
with a knight who ‘greatlie entreated’ them with ‘faire speaches’ to make 
‘articles covenantes and agreementes’ about digging a pond at his Highgate 
estate, but that agreement became a trap rather than a mutually agreeable 
bond. They were covenanted for the completion of the pond, rather than 
paid by the day, because (they claimed) the knight had tested the ground 
and knew the job would prove extremely difficult. The laborers soon ‘were 
compelled to pawne and sell theire poore bedding from under them’ and 
were ‘scarce able to put bread into their mouthes’ yet could not complete the 
job. As they struggled with this Sisyphean task, the knight undid each day’s 
labor by driving over their work: ‘by his great and weightie carriages over 
the pond hedd he made spoile thereof ’, so they had to daily watch how ‘the 
worke sunke downe and decaied instantlie’ under the carriages. The knight 
threatened ‘the utter ruyne and impoverishment of them, theire poore wives 
and Children … without anie remorse of Conscyence’, and he eventually had 
them hauled into the Marshalsea. He refused ‘mediation’ and ‘all possible 
perswations’ of third parties (REQ2.402.85). Plaintiffs like these men placed 
their last hope in the court and asked it to restore the moral order by asserting 
‘Conscyence’ over contract. And such language of ruin, downfall, despair, 
and ‘grievous hinderaunce’ made conventional but powerful flourishes 
(REQ2.416.47). ‘Poore & distressed’ William Gethin of Chancery Lane 
spent years as ‘Covenante servant’ to a great lady, a widowed Dame, until he 
was mistreated ‘againste all equitie and justice & to [his] utter undoeing’. The 
chief abuse he recounted involved a complication of credit; in the course of 
keeping the household stocked he ‘was dryven at sundrie tymes to borrowe 
& make hard shiftes for money to paye for the same provision to advoid the 
clamor of the poore people that sold the same’. He assumed these were the 
widow’s debts, not his own expenses, but his mistress allegedly stuck him 
with them (REQ2.300.52). Such tensions between overlapping roles and 
unclear responsibilities – a servant as an extension of a master vs. a servant 
as an autonomous economic individual – feature prominently in the final 
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case I discuss, a case rooted in the ‘hard shifts’ and ‘clamor’ of early modern 
market culture. At their most extreme, vulnerable plaintiffs even invoked the 
specter of death: an orphaned apprentice was ‘meanly imployed’ and deprived 
of ‘Competent meate drinke or lodginge’, and he ‘had perished if his friends 
had not provided for him’ (REQ2.391.140).
In their overall rhetorical blend – desperation and indignation leavened 
with politeness and humility – the Complaints resemble the petitions to charities 
and municipal poor relief studied by Steve Hindle; those ‘narratives of distress’ 
are likewise ‘far from standardized, and the scrivener or clerk who drew them 
up seems to have done so with the claimant at his elbow’, but they usually mix a 
‘popular discourse of pity’ with an insistence on the good character, reputation, 
honesty, and former industriousness of the petitioner (2004, 155-162). Lawyers 
and clerks undoubtedly did shape the narratives of victimization submitted 
to Requests, though diverse historians (prominent among them Davis 1987; 
Gowing 1996; and Fox 2000) have provided models for productively reading 
court records, and Hindle himself traces the migration of discourses across 
pulpits, pamphlets, and petitions. Lamar Hill represents an optimistic yet careful 
reader of Requests documents, one who insists that ‘although the records of their 
litigation may be highly mediated, we can still hear with some confidence the 
unmediated voices of the litigants through the filters of legal counsel’ (2007, 
136). In his article on four cases of debt litigation, Hill finds that ‘a world of 
richly textured detail is revealed that allows us to “hear” the approximate voices 
of the participants’ in the narratives taken down by scribes who, he reminds us, 
‘were trained listeners’ (139, 155). If that sounds too confident, in practice Hill 
is less emphatic about authenticity and more concerned with hearing ‘multiple 
discourses’ and ‘overlapping voices, each speaking to a different audience, be 
it the Crown, the masters of requests, the opposing party, or the witnesses’ 
(140-141). He confirms that the masters of Requests (the judges) valued 
hierarchy and deference and, ‘in fact, whenever the masters applied equity 
they reaffirmed the hierarchical order’ (153). So much is absolutely true, but 
the ambivalent nature of an equitable venue that worked both for and against 
hierarchy – that could locally overrule a master’s will while globally validating 
the dominant ideologies of degree – placed subordinates in a tricky rhetorical 
situation. A further potential interpretive pitfall is that very few cases went to 
final judgment (which involved an oral stage lost to us), and those few decrees 
are terse, so we have no sure guide to exactly what language worked and why.17 
But proceeding to final decree was rare in most courts, and Muldrew points out 
that in civil debt litigation ‘making a complaint with a court clerk would also 
have been a way of communicating the threat of litigation’, a forceful but not 
17 ‘Whenever they could, the Masters encouraged alternative methods of settlement’ 
(Stretton 1998, 81-83).
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necessarily radioactive escalation of an ongoing conversation (1998, 202, though 
I suspect a Requests Complaint was a more serious step). So while we should be 
skeptical about genuine voices in the Complaints, we may just as easily recast 
that apparent problem as a useful opportunity to eavesdrop on a specialized 
cultural language, a nuanced and polyphonic form of communication between 
servants and masters – communication paradoxically made more powerful by 
being filtered and arbitrated by a powerful institution. Listening in on this 
language, while being mindful that subordinates helped produce some of the 
multiple discourses Hill wants to track but also recognizing that some things 
would be imposed on them, may shed further light on the ongoing debate 
about individual agency in early modern England.
The difficult rhetorical task servants and the poor faced was embedded 
in their uncertain social position, one of only limited and contingent rights. 
Social historians of the Braddick and Walter school of ‘negotiation’ have 
followed James Scott and demonstrated (and perhaps at times overstated) 
the agency of low status individuals. Keith Wrightson summarizes a certain 
consensus about the limited power of the powerless:
they could certainly influence the terms and conditions of their own subordinate place, 
by contractual negotiation, by their mode of conduct in the performance of their work, 
and on occasion – especially when legitimate expectations had been betrayed – by 
open insubordination. Servants could dispute the appropriateness of the tasks allocated 
them, or protest at failure to pay them as promised. Apprentices could and did lay out 
complaints against their masters and mistresses for maltreatment or neglect. (2000, 66)
The Court of Requests gave them an important forum for such disputes (no 
matter how much it was clogged by run-of-the-mill debt litigation). However, 
attending to the formal qualities of the self-presentational and rhetorical 
tactics employed by subordinates within the institutional confines of the 
court may help flesh out these negotiations and trace the lineaments of both 
the opportunities and oppressions those negotiations produced. Requests 
was less expensive than most legal venues, but it placed other all-too-familiar 
costs upon poor plaintiffs. Like so many other interactions and institutions, 
it extracted what Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic taxes’: ‘the concessions of politeness 
always contain political concessions’ (1977a, 95).
Scott dismisses Bourdieu and lumps him in with less sophisticated theories 
of false consciousness and mystification. But for Bourdieu, ‘the seemingly 
most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners’ do not 
instantly produce the conscious consent of deluded social inferiors.18 Instead, 
such symbolic taxes build a generative matrix, deep in the body, of preconscious 
18 ‘Practical belief is not a “state of mind”, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of 
instituted dogmas and doctrines (“beliefs”), but rather a state of the body’ (Bourdieu 1990, 68).
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schemes of perception and action – ‘values given body, made body’ (1977a, 
94). These matrices Bourdieu calls ‘habitus, systems of durable transposable 
dispositions’ that govern human practice and, though richly improvisational, 
limit agency (1977a, 72).19 Gouge’s recommendations for a well ordered 
household also stress what Bourdieu calls the ‘small change of the compliance’ 
of everyday routine (Bourdieu 1990, 68). Servants, writes Gouge, must ensure 
‘that all their words spoken to their master be meeke, milde and humble’, and 
they must always display ‘Reverence in cariage’ – standing and removing their 
hat, for example, as ‘a signe and token of subjection’ (1622, 598, 601-602). 
Such tokens may be small, but Gouge wants them to amount collectively to 
a subordination and ‘modestie’ transmitted in (using one of Bourdieu’s own 
favorite formulations) ‘the whole disposition of bodie’ (1622, 602). Domesticall 
Duties is a prescriptive text, full of authoritarian ideals, and exactly the kind of 
public transcript Scott insists plebeians easily see through and manipulate.20 
But Gouge clearly hopes the formal aspects of deference will help inculcate the 
constructive ‘ feare and trembling’ subordinates should continually feel:
Feare is both as a fountaine from whence all other duties flow: and also as a sawce to 
season them all … This trembling feare is needful in regard of the small love that 
servants commonly beare to their masters … servants must labour to nourish it, as a 
meanes to keepe them from over-much boldnesse. (1622, 615-616)
From that nourished and nourishing fear, Gouge makes the short step to ‘serving 
with sincerity … in singleness of heart’ (616). The stories of polite submission 
that plaintiffs offered up to Requests, and the experience of working with 
clerks to craft pleadings that paid lavish tribute to hierarchy, operated in 
at least partial complicity with the early modern world’s ceaseless labor of 
symbolic domination.21
So, on one hand, the court lent special attention to the weak, but it only 
seems to have listened for the rhetorical modes and micro-genres it wanted 
to hear: carefully articulated pleadings for mercy, not demands for justice 
between social equals. The court must therefore have been a powerful force 
19 ‘Practical sense, social necessity turned into nature, converted into motor schemes 
and body automatisms, is what causes practices, in and through what makes them obscure 
to the eyes of their producers, to be sensible, that is, informed by common sense … Every 
social order systematically takes advantage of the disposition of the body and language to 
function as depositories of deferred thoughts that can be triggered off’ (Bourdieu 1990, 69).
20 Scott, in fact, merely inverts the process when he claims that elites internalize their 
own performances: ‘They have a collective theater to maintain which often becomes part 
of their self-definition’ in ‘a kind of self-hypnosis within ruling groups’ (1990, 50, 67-69).
21 For quick accounts of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, and its contribution to 
hidden modes of domination, see his essay ‘Symbolic Power’ (1977b) and Outline of a Theory 
of Practice (1977a, 171-197).
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constituting and enforcing oppressive class identities. As Andy Wood points 
out in a compelling article, the ‘cognitive dissonance’ produced by the public 
and the hidden transcripts appears ‘in the contradictory relationship between 
popular litigation – in which the plebian litigant was expected to identify 
her or himself as “powerless” – and the clear fact of plebian assertiveness 
explicit in the act of litigation against a gentleman, a lord or a master’. Wood 
stresses the negative effects on the self-conception of the poor, arguing that 
such language, even if ‘knowingly manipulated’, made ‘plebian litigants … 
complicit in the maintenance of their own subordination, so they helped to 
maintain a kind of elite cultural hegemony’, and Wood thus amplifies the 
importance of even contrived expressions of deference (2006a, 811-812).22 No 
single case can tell us anything concrete about the real psychological makeup 
of the specific litigants involved. But they do shed light on the expectations 
this culture held about how subordinates should act and even how they should 
feel, and scholars like Patricia Fumerton have investigated the subjectivities 
of the many people experiencing ‘shallow poverty’, including the working 
poor and lower middling-sort householders (2006, xvii). Their geographic, 
social, and vocational mobility coupled with their economic vulnerability 
cultivated an ‘unsettled’ subjectivity that, according to Fumerton, pervaded 
the ‘multiple types of “selves”’ these individuals were forced to adapt in the ‘the 
shifting “ground” of an increasingly unsettled economy’ (5, 31). So Requests 
Complaints do afford a look at some of the fraught ‘role speculations (not 
role-playing)’ the working poor had to engage in, and how assuming these 
roles may have contributed to the more damaging or unpleasant elements 
Fumerton finds in ‘“low” subjectivity’ (45, 4).23 Enacting or wielding a public 
transcript may have been tactical, but tactical does not mean inconsequential.
On the other hand, Craig Muldrew’s influential research on debt 
litigation points in a more positive direction. He reveals that, although 
poor people comprised a smaller percentage of litigants, they sued people 
above them often. On the whole, ‘litigation became a leveling force’ in early 
modern England because it was instrumental in disseminating a specific 
type of equality that was reshaping the culture (1998, 247-253). ‘Equality in 
22 According to Wood, ‘the public transcript of elite domination has the effect of 
continuously disconnecting how subordinates feel from how they act’ (2006a, 811). Further, 
linguistic expressions of weakness in the face of elite power ‘constructed a binary opposition 
between an apparently powerless commons and a clearly powerful gentry’ that ‘did more 
than simply describe; it constituted ’ those power asymmetries and ‘helped to legitimate the 
existence of both ruling institutions – central courts – and ruling discourses – the language 
of paternalism’ (812).
23 Fumerton insists that the working poor ‘necessarily speculated in different work 
roles’ to survive, since they could not ‘afford to be role-playing’ when their assumption of 
different identities and postures ‘involved serious economic investment’ (2006, 34, 51).
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exchange’, he explains, ‘was moral in nature; it was equality of the potential 
to be trusted, and certainly not an equality of opportunity or wealth’ (146, 
see also 97).24 While Requests observed hierarchies of social inequality, it also 
validated this moral equality. When trying to reconcile ‘politique inequality’ 
or earthly degree with ‘spirituall equality’, Gouge writes that someone ‘more 
excellent in the one, may be inferior in the other’ (1622, 593). Though 
Gouge keeps most forms of equality safely contained in the sweet hereafter, 
marginalized plaintiffs might make the Court of Requests recognize spiritual 
or moral equality and even import it into ‘civill and temporall matters’ (593) 
– no small achievement.25
In sum, while these documents indicate that deference may have been the 
real price of admission to this institution, they also show how such deference 
could become empowering. Even calculated or cynical performances of 
deference carry psychological disadvantages, but inverting the discourses of 
weakness and power represents subtle but demonstrable acts of resistance. 
And Complaints generally display a pattern of temporal movement towards 
greater assertiveness: they recount past injuries, humiliations, and servility, 
are couched in a present-tense of measured deference, and then call for future 
24 Muldrew’s analysis of multiple forms of justice and equality provides an important 
context, especially the displacement of distributive justice by commutative justice. He links 
the former with patronage, hierarchy, and older ideas about market regulation and links the 
latter with civic humanism, natural law theory, increased litigation, and participation in a 
vibrant market culture: ‘The distributive justice of patronage, benefits or charity based on 
inequality of status or rank’ held that those in authority should be responsive to ‘traditional 
paternalistic moral notions about the entitlement of the poor’ (1998, 47). But Muldrew 
argues that market forces and the court system worked together to instill a growing 
emphasis on commutative justice and ‘equalization in exchange’ (44) that he clearly views 
as an egalitarian development, albeit one which created great hardship for some and would 
lead to ‘a new more absolute utilitarian ideology of free trade’ and self-interest (51). These 
two ideas coexisted, of course, and their sometimes uneasy coexistence registers in the 
Requests archives. Further, the Complaints indicate that, although legal proceedings might 
indeed have been the engine of a growing sense of equality, some litigants relied more upon 
older ideals of distributive justice and the obligations of their superiors – hence the rhetoric 
of submission, trust, deference, and powerlessness.
25 Gouge’s final pages constitute a forceful endorsement of this provisional equality: ‘For 
howsoever in outward dignity there is great difference betwixt master and servant, yet as the 
servants of God they are of a like condition, and in many things may be accounted equall’ (1622, 
691). In another illustration of the ambiguities of service, he firmly decrees subordinates must 
meekly suffer all punishments from ‘unjust masters’, even ‘though correction be injustly inflicted, 
yet it is patiently to be endured’ in this world (612); however, throughout his chapters on servants 
and masters, Gouge favors the language of both justice and equity (see especially 656-657, 665). He 
similarly attempts to thread a very fine needle when he maintains that a servant should constantly 
fear a master and attempt to internalize his will, but that servant must not become a ‘parasite’ or a 
‘fawning dog’ (638). All told, even in Gouge’s thoughtful and totalizing account of the social order, 
early modern cultural ideals pull in many different directions.
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accountability and material reparations. To adopt a modern saying, plaintiffs 
who won (or triggered a favorable extra-judicial resolution) found themselves 
groveling all the way to the bank.
Let me finish with a more extended look at one case which includes three 
pleadings and several witness depositions (this is a relatively rare opportunity, 
since few cases went beyond the initial Complaint with any substance). When 
John Honneyborne died his widow sued his master for almost three years 
of wages that she said her husband never received. Reading this suit in full 
underscores that the Court of Requests did value facts – cold finances and 
technical legal rights – but also entertained more subjective considerations 
including pathos, motivation, fairness, and broad social codes. The two sides 
of this conflict engaged in a tug-of-war over that terrain: the defendant and 
his witnesses stressed written records and numbers, while the plaintiff and 
her witnesses emphasized the emotive aspect of economic relationships. 
A baker in St. Clement Danes named Peter Wraxall made ‘private 
Communicacion & agreement’ with John Honneyborne (‘a Jorney man and 
worker’ in the ‘misterye of Bakeinge’) for eight pounds yearly, and this case 
again exemplifies the difficulties such private agreements could create. ‘In moste 
humblewise complayning’ Lettice Honneyborne – John’s widow – told the court 
that her husband died ‘very poore’ after five years with Wraxall, leaving her 
almost nothing but some money owed by Wraxall. ‘Diverse & sundry tymes’ 
she has requested the unpaid wages, but Wraxall ‘still doth refuse contrary to 
all Right equity & good Conscience’. If she ‘should be deceaved or yf the same 
should be longe detained’, she and her children will become utterly destitute. 
She lacks written proofs, so ‘hath noe ordynary remedy by the Course of the 
Common Lawes’. Nevertheless, she believes that Wraxall ‘being urged & pressed 
… upon his Corporall oath Cannot denye the same but must of necessitye 
confesse the same to be true’ (REQ2.414.76: Complaint).26
The Complaint is a bit formulaic, but effective enough that the court agreed 
to hear the case. According to Wraxall’s Answer (his formal defense) John did 
‘come to serve this defendant in the trade of a baker’ five years ago. But later 
he did ‘covenant and agree’ with John for a slightly different job. To encourage 
John ‘to be a trewe and faithfull servant’, Wraxall ‘was perswaded to give the 
said John Honnyborne some better place of service as in Caryinge of his bread 
to his Customers and receavinge of the monyes for the same’. In this position 
John moved out of direct supervision in the bakehouse and enjoyed some 
independence at the same yearly wage, but on the condition that he ‘behave 
himself well in his service’. But this new relationship also allowed Wraxall some 
26 This suit has been archived in two separate files, which is not uncommon. The 
Complaint, Wraxall’s Answer, and the plaintiff’s Replication are found in 414.76, but all 
depositions are found in 406.47.
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advantages. In answering the charges, Wraxall not only denied owing any back 
wages (claiming the wages were simply deducted from bread payments), but 
claimed that John owed him large sums for bread he had delivered on credit. 
In fact, Wraxall ruthlessly pushed a countercharge that the widow was willfully 
failing to pay that debt as she sold off her dead husband’s belongings and hid 
the money. He rather snidely promised to pay the disputed wages (about 22 
pounds) as soon as he receives satisfaction for over fourscore pounds worth of 
bread (REQ2.414.76: Answer).
The depositions of Wraxall’s brother, apprentice, and another servant 
confirm the baker’s story, and describe his accounting system. Bread tallies were 
kept upon ‘greate broade Boardes’, and as a servant brought in payments from 
customers his tallies were ‘Strucken out as he payeth’, but John Honneyborne 
had allegedly fallen badly behind. John had been delivering bread ‘uppon 
truste and Creddytt’ and could make ‘no Satisfaccion or Accompte’ for most 
of it, so one day Wraxall’s apprentice had made deliveries with John to try to 
record the amounts owed by his customers. The apprentice took the notes, 
which perhaps hints that John was either illiterate or not fully trusted. This 
note was submitted as evidence and the situation confirms how, in a cash-
scarce society, middlemen relying on the complex chains of credit Muldrew 
describes could easily become overextended.27 Nevertheless, the apprentice and 
another servant insinuated that Wraxall had earlier examined Honneyborne 
about some ‘Dishoneste Daleing’ concerning 40 shillings worth of yeast, and 
that some customers later contested the debts John attributed to them. When 
John fell severely sick, his master’s efforts to recoup or at least clarify these debts 
assumed a new urgency, so at least three more times Wraxall tried to get the 
accounts down on paper. First he dispatched his brother to the sick man’s house 
to interrogate him about the amounts, but ‘that Recconinge was very shorte’. 
Then Wraxall sent his servants ‘to see his table booke’, but ‘they Could fynd 
none wherein any of such his Recconinges were’. John Honneyborne, whether 
literate or illiterate, creditor or debtor, honest or dishonest, moved primarily in 
the informal economy of verbal assurances, interpersonal trust, and unwritten 
balances so familiar from Muldrew’s work (REQ2.406.47: Depositions of John 
Weeks, Abraham Wraxall, and Francis Plant).28 
27 Muldrew 1998, passim, but see especially 95-98. Hill finds Requests to be an excellent 
archive for testing Muldrew’s arguments, since it shows Muldrew’s ‘ideal types’ in conflict. The 
court, Hill argues, had to juggle the conflicting demands of hierarchy, equity, and credit: ‘the 
masters were obligated to restore order, one of the principle functions of the elites. At the same 
time, however, they assisted in preventing the collapse of a credit economy frequently driven by the 
demands of deference. The balance between the interests of hierarchy and of credit was difficult 
to maintain. Without sufficient circulating coin the task was all the more difficult’ (2007, 153).
28 One of those servants reported that Wraxall sent to the Honneyborne household 
‘for diverse of such goods and things … because hee [Wraxall] would have had some things 
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Wraxall finally brought a scrivener to John’s deathbed to notarize everything 
John could remember of his customers’ debts, but the sick man could not 
remember much. The scrivener was called as a witness on Wraxall’s behalf, but 
he claimed that John ‘was reputed an honeste man’ and he thought the customers 
disputing their debts would not be doing so had he lived. He did acknowledge, 
though, that John probably died in Wraxall’s debt, not vice versa. The scrivener’s 
deposition records an uneasy moment of contact between the world of papers and 
the world of promises. As Wraxall asked him about his customers, the sick man 
‘Answeared verry slolye, but tould [Wraxall] Justlie what was owinge by some of 
his Customers but not what was owinge by them all’ while the scrivener took notes. 
When Wraxall could squeeze no more out of John he ‘seeinge his weakenes … 
used these words or the lyke in effecte vz [videlicet] I shall loose muche monney 
by this manes death. And soe they Came Awaye. And within a daye or twoe or 
three dayes after he departed this lyffe’ (REQ2.406.47: Deposition of John West).
The defense documents (Wraxall’s Answer and the depositions of his allies) 
steer the conflict both in theme and in mode. Instead of discussing wages, they 
make John’s debts the central topic – indeed, a reader could forget that Wraxall 
is the defendant. They also employ a drier, more detached tone amounting to 
a tactically different mode of legal discourse, one centered on concrete facts 
and amounts and generally avoiding comment on interpersonal relationships. 
Indeed, perhaps the only emotional moment is the scrivener’s account of 
Wraxall’s cold conduct. But Wraxall sidestepped some key questions: to what 
extent were the men whom he calls servants acting as his representatives? They 
could not possibly expect frequent cash payments from bread recipients, so 
did they willingly assume risks themselves, or did they believe that they were 
extending their master’s credit, not their own? In short, were Wraxall’s delivery 
men servants within a full-fledged ideology of reciprocal obligations familiar 
from prescriptive literature, or were they considered independent economic 
agents in a market culture of contractual equality? Though both sides wanted 
money, the tension between raw numbers and social bonds represents a crucial 
but only partially articulated field of struggle.
This struggle becomes most evident when comparing Wraxall’s defense 
with the discourse produced by John’s widow, Lettice, and her allies. While the 
defense fought dispassionately, the prosecution went right for the heartstrings 
with emotional arguments and moral evaluations. The widow’s Replication (her 
formal reply to Wraxall’s Answer) foregrounds how John Honnyborne, falling 
sick, was motivated ‘out of Conscience towards god & care towards his wife & 
children & the Defendant … to sett all reaconninges straight betweene hym 
towards Satisfaccion of his debts’. The widow, allegedly, ‘had pawned them: whereby yt 
appeared shee made some of hir husbands goods away Least [Wraxall] should Recover them 
from her for his Debts’ (REQ2.406.47: Deposition of Francis Plant).
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& his saide Master the Deffendant’. He wanted to be paid for the last three 
years of service, but he also wanted to discharge whatever amounts he owed 
his master (and under this account those were very small). Wraxall ignored 
him until John desperately braved ‘daungerous sicknes [and] went heance to 
the house of the Deffendant & then & there required him to accompt’ of 
all tallies and wages. Wraxall would not even deign to answer, but ‘cuningly 
withdrew himself … & went out of a backe doore’ until John was ‘enforced 
for very sicknes and faintnes to depart’. At home, John ‘with weepeinge teares’ 
told his wife the bad news. John had not yet lost faith in his master, and as he 
languished ‘his comfort was’ that his master would give his family three years’ 
wages at the least ‘for saide he wee accompted at Christmas laste’ and came to 
that understanding after clearing up all tallies and debts. But he could not ‘be 
quiett in his mynde’ so kept sending friends to his master asking him to come 
meet with him. According to this document Wraxall refused until he heard 
that ‘John was both speechles and without memory & then indeed he came & 
tooke … all the tallyes and scores in the saide Johns house’, but did casually 
acknowledge to Lettice that ‘all was well’ between them and that he would 
pay at least some back wages. All told, the preponderance of the Replication is 
given over to moral evaluations of the two men; John Honneyborne’s religious 
sense of duty to his family and master, his diligence, and his sorrowful tears 
upon his return home draw a stark contrast to the rude and grasping master 
who ignored a dying man’s pleas and only came to ransack the home and the 
mind of his servant for his own gain (REQ2.414.76: Replication).
Witnesses for the prosecution corroborated these accounts, and likewise spent 
their rhetorical energy stressing character, conduct, and sentiment. One witness said 
he knew nothing of the details but insisted that ‘Hunnyeburne Carried him selfe 
verrye honestlie and well, dealing Justlie and uprightlie with all men’ (REQ2.406.47: 
Deposition of Thomas Hodges). A neighbor acting as an intermediary went to the 
bakehouse to speak to Wraxall but received only curt answers:
Master Wraxhall I pray you Lett me Intreate you to goe unto John Hunnyburne 
and Lett him and you Reccon and Accompte togeather before he dies that yt maye 
be openlye knowne to the worlde what is betweene you and he for his poore wyffe 
and Childerins sakes, then the defendant Wraxalle Answered her nothinge but only 
said he hoped he would not then die. (REQ2.406.47: Deposition of Anne Dawson)
A maid recounted a painful rebuttal when John, ‘verry sycke and weake’, 
was spurned by Wraxall who ‘Onlye said to him “howe nowe” and went out 
of his backe doore’.29 These witnesses excoriated the baker for coming too 
29 The scribe set parentheses around ‘Howe nowe’ in an attempt to set off reported 
speech. I have changed them to quotation marks for clarity.
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late to John’s house, waiting ‘untill he was almoste speecheles’ and then only 
coming to bully a dying man ‘not capable of any busynesses nor A man of this 
world’. A sister-in-law dwelt on how Lettice felt the pressure as she grieved; the 
‘morninge after [she] had buried her husbande’ she demanded that Wraxall’s 
servant explain how her husband could possibly be so deeply indebted. These 
witnesses also described how Lettice ‘wepte to the defendant sayinge that her 
husband and shee had often sent for him to make even togeather before god 
Called him’. These witnesses did address the back wages and some claimed 
they heard Wraxall promise to pay them, but the rhetorical tactics are clear: 
while the defense fixated on tallies, tears carried the prosecution’s argument 
(REQ2.406.47: Depositions of Anne Dawson, Elizabeth Campion, and 
Cycelye Honneyborne).
Tim Stretton notes that, in Requests, ‘judges were asked to choose 
between two or more conflicting representations of the truth, rather than 
to attempt to reconstitute the truth itself ’ (1998, 14). In the conflicts I have 
been describing between (relative) elites and the people who served them, 
those representations of truth not only diverge into competing narratives, 
but into competing visions of social organization and competing modes 
of expression. In the case of Honneyborne vs. Wraxall, one witness for the 
prosecution closed with an intriguing comment that may illuminate some 
of these ideological forces at work in this archive: she heard two bakehouse 
servants ‘saye the greate Booke wherein the truthe would appeare betweene 
them the plaintiff and defendant was kepte out of the waye they Could not 
see yt. And woondered the defendant did deny to pay her husbands wages’ 
(REQ2.406.47: Deposition of Elizabeth Campion). The statement primarily 
implies that Wraxall kept secret accounts while manipulating the public tallies, 
and thus unfairly withheld wages. But beyond that immediate meaning, the 
resonance these carefully corrected words have to a major trope of Christian 
millenarianism is unmistakable – an unknowable ‘greate Booke’ where 
absolute truth resides cannot fail to connote divine judgment. The comment 
retroactively elevates this story of a dying servant struggling to earn a final 
reward via his last reckoning with an inaccessible master to a grander scale. In 
this murmuring about a secret book and an unpaid debt the various issues of 
the case appear to coalesce: two economies (informal vs. formal), two forms 
of master-servant relationships (mutual obligation vs. strict economics), two 
modes of pleading (emotional vs. numerical), and two conceptions of justice 
(distributive vs. commutative).
In the Court of Requests the harsh laws of money and masters had to 
contend with the more charitable justice of equity, and I have stressed how 
those conflicts often fell out along a written-oral divide and how those conflicts 
were fought in the discourses of the elite. But this confrontation may hint at 
a radical alternative where debts, tallies, and contracts will be overwritten by 
the fulfilled promises of a higher justice. ‘The language of spiritual accounting 
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also continued to be related to credit relations’, says Muldrew (1998, 146), 
and such language plays a key role in Gouge’s explication of the relationships 
between masters and servants; he reminds his readers that God ‘will require 
an account of them for all that are under their government’ (1622, 666). And 
while he grants masters wide authority, he concludes his tract by forcefully 
invoking Ephesians 6:9: ‘your master also is in heaven: neither is there respect of 
persons with him’ (689). All worldly authority will end and there will finally 
be ‘no difference betwixt master and servant’, he writes, again emphasizing 
spiritual accounting:
The first reason which declareth the subjection of masters, in that they have a master 
over them, putteth them in minde of that account which they are to make, and 
reckoning which they are to give of the well using of their authority and of their 
cariage towards such as are under them. For they are but as stewards over fellow 
servants: every one of them therefore shall heare this charge, give an account of thy 
stewardship. (689)
Servants and laborers presumably were not often buying and studying conduct 
literature and household advice tomes like Domesticall Duties.30 But Gouge 
articulates something of the larger cultural air they breathed, and even the 
dominant discourses that spoke from pulpits and political offices afforded 
subordinates a social position not entirely without rights and ideological 
resources.31 Servants and employees held a liminal and contradictory status; 
in Requests they responded to that ambiguous status with pleadings that 
were necessarily dialogical in the fullest Bakhtinian sense – layered and 
multiaccentual discourse that is effective because of, not in spite of, its blend 
of personal utterance and cultural quotation.
30 This is not to say it never happened. Ben-Amos records that ‘conduct books and 
books of advice and instruction … were sometimes purchased by adolescents and youths’ 
during their periods of life-cycle service, and in church ‘there were apprentices who followed 
the sermon intently and even took notes’ (1994, 190).
31 Many of Gouge’s points are entirely conventional, and are echoed by other conduct 
writers. For example, Dod and Cleaver likewise use Ephesians 6:9 to insist that masters 
should inflict punishment ‘remembring always that they have a maister in heaven, before 
whom they must make an account for their doings’ and repeating that ‘they must yield to 
God their maister a straight account’ (1621, sigs Z5r-Z6r). They also decree that ‘obedience 
and service must be done with feare and trembling, in singleness of heart’ while servants 
always ‘be reverent and lowly … in their words and gestures’ (sig Aa5r).
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